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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 30, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed an en banc Federal 
Circuit decision in a high-profile patent case, Impression Products, Inc. v. 
Lexmark International, Inc.1 Following Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega 
Corp.,2 SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, 
LLC, 3  and TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,4  the 
 
 1.  Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2017), rev’g 816 F.3d 
721 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
 2.  Life Tech. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 743 (2017) (indirect infringement), rev’g 
773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 3.  SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) 
(laches defense), vacating in part 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 4.  TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520-21 (2017) (venue 
of patent infringement actions), rev’g In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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decision is the fourth Supreme Court decision in the 2017 term that reversed 
the Federal Circuit judgment. 
In Impression Products, the Federal Circuit refused to apply patent 
exhaustion, a judiciary-made doctrine, which terminates a patent owner’s 
rights over sold or otherwise disposed of items,5 to products sold abroad.6 In 
addition, the Federal Circuit held that the patent owner could preserve the 
rights to exclude buyers of sold products from reusing or reselling them, 
through clearly communicated, otherwise-lawful “single-use/no-resale” 
restrictions.7 The Federal Circuit’s conclusion in Impression Products was 
nothing new because the Federal Circuit had previously held that patent 
exhaustion is not triggered by foreign sales in Jazz Photo Corp. v. 
International Trade Commission,8 and that post-sale restrictions can prevent 
patent exhaustion in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.9 
The Federal Circuit decision gathered considerable attention from legal 
professionals because they had different opinions about whether Kirtsaeng 
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. had overruled Jazz Photo,10 and whether Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. had overruled Mallinckrodt.11  In 
Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court applied copyright exhaustion to books sold 
abroad.12 Thus, some expected that the Federal Circuit would overrule Jazz 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1852) (judicial recognition of patent 
exhaustion).  
 6.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 760–62, 774 (en banc) (Fed. Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 546 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
 7.  Id. at 753, 760. 
 8.  See id. at 754–56 (discussing Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 
overruled by Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523). 
 9.  See id. at 735–39, 752–53 (discussing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 
(Fed. Cir. 1992), overruled by Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523. 
 10.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 539–45 (2013). For the discussion of 
Kirtsaeng’s precedential value in relation to Jazz Photo, see San Disk Corp. v. Round Rock Research 
LLC, No. C 11-5243 RS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81290, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014); see also LG 
Elecs., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. March 13, 2009); Static Control Components 
v. Lexmark Int’l, 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585–88 (E.D. Ky. 2009), aff’d, 697 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 
134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). But see Robert Bosch LLC v. Trico Prods. Corp., No. 12 C 437, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 69902, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2014) (following Jazz Photo’s rule). 
 11.  Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625–26 (2008). For the discussion of 
Quanta’s ruling in relation to Mallinckrodt, see Ergowerx Int’l, LLC v. Maxell Corp. of Am., 18 F. Supp. 
3d 430, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that Quanta overturned the conditional sales doctrine); see also 
Civil Action at *22, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, 9 F. Supp. 3d 830 (S.D. 
Ohio 2014) (No. 1: 10-CV-564), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41045, rev’d, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression 
Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); Alfred C. Server & William J. 
Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS 
L.J. 561, 596 (2013). 
 12.  Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538–45. 
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Photo and adopt international patent exhaustion.13 Similarly, Quanta’s broad 
application of patent exhaustion caused uncertainty about the validity of 
post-sale restrictions including the single-use/no-resale restriction imposed 
by Lexmark International, Inc. (“Lexmark”).14 
Moreover, Impression Products was closely followed by business 
leaders because the Supreme Court’s adoption of international patent 
exhaustion might require restructuring of  the U.S. economy, shifts in the 
international trade, and changes in people’s lives.15 Without international 
patent exhaustion, a U.S. patent owner may, not only seek monetary damages 
from importers of patented products but also seize products at the national 
border even if the patent owner sold the imported products or permitted their 
sales in foreign countries. 
International patent exhaustion will affect interests of patent-holding 
companies that have sold cheaply-priced products abroad under the 
assumption that the products will not be brought into the United States for 
resale.16 In a commonly-called international price discrimination, companies 
sell their products at different prices in different countries depending on the 
market condition and the intellectual property protection. 17  International 
patent exhaustion will likely cause influx of foreign-sold products and reduce 
the prices of many products in the U.S. market.18 Innovative technology 
companies and brand pharmaceuticals expressed concerns that their research 
and development would be sacrificed through reduced earnings.19 
 
 13.  See Impression Prods., 816 F.3d at 786–88 (Dyk, J., dissenting); see also Scott W. Doyle, et 
al., Lexmark Is Much Ado About Nothing — For Now, LAW360 (Feb. 18, 2016, 9:59 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/760145?scroll=1. 
 14.  See Impression Prods., 816 F.3d at 779–83 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 15.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (patent infringement); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012) 
(exclusion of infringing products by the customs officials). 
 16.  See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of 
International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 17, 20–26 (2016); see also John A. 
Rothchild, Exhausting Extraterritoriality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2011). 
 17.  Richard M. Andrade, The Parallel Importation of Unauthorized Genuine Goods: Analysis and 
Observations of the Gray Market, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 409, 415 (1993). 
 18.  Tech companies, including Google Inc., Quanta Computer Inc., and Texas Instruments Inc., 
urged the Federal Circuit to loosen reuse restrictions for overseas sales because supply chains for products 
like smartphones can include hundreds of suppliers and sub-manufacturers based all over the world. Scott 
Graham, Supreme Court Dives into Patent Exhaustion with Printer Cartridges, NAT. L.J. (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202773928257/?slreturn=20170926175203. 
 19.  See Brief for Am. Intell. Prop. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Impression 
Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
285; see also Brief for Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. Of Am. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Impression 
Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
738; Brief for Biotech. Innovation Org. & Croplife Int’l as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 644.). 
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Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court.20 
Reversing the Federal Circuit decision, the Court stated that the common law 
prohibition against restraints on the use and sale of products has provided the 
foundation of patent exhaustion.21 It held that the post-sale restriction should 
not provide a ground for denial of patent exhaustion, 22  and that patent 
exhaustion should apply to foreign sales.23 Justice Ginsburg dissented in part 
and concurred in part, and wrote that foreign sales should not cause 
exhaustion of U.S. patent rights.24 
With a purpose to elaborate the recognition of international patent 
exhaustion in Impression Products, and explain why the Federal Circuit “got 
off on the wrong foot,”25  this paper reviews the primary and secondary 
authorities that discussed the common law prohibition against servitudes on 
personal property and the equitable servitudes, and explains what exactly the 
exhaustion doctrine has been, as established by case law, and investigates its 
relationship to the common law servitude rule and the newly-developed 
equitable servitudes. 26  Part II starts with introduction of Impression 
Products, followed by an explanation of the common law prohibition against 
servitudes on personal property, copyright exhaustion, and patent 
exhaustion. Part III proposes and explains a two-step test for the 
determination on patent exhaustion: the first inquiry pertains to the need for 
the protection of third-party acquirers of goods to ensure the certainty of 
trade and the alienability of personal property; and the second part 
determines whether and how public interests such as the maintenance of 
competition and the promotion of science and useful arts would be affected 
by denial or application of patent exhaustion. In conclusion, it explains that 
the proposed two-step test will lead to the same conclusion that the Supreme 
Court reached in Impression Products. 
 
 20.  Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1523 (2017). 
 21.  Id. at 1531–33. 
 22.  Id. at 1530. 
 23.  Id. at 1535–36. 
 24.  Id. at 1538–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting concerning international patent exhaustion). 
 25.  Id. at 1533. 
 26.  The word “restraint” is hereinafter used to mean any limitation of a person’s freedom, such as 
a contractual obligation upon a buyer or a licensee and a restriction that results from presence of 
intellectual property rights. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief Summary of Impression Products 
1. Facts and Procedural Highlights: Imported Modified Single-
Use Printer Cartridges 
The plaintiff, Lexmark, is a major producer of laser printers and toner 
cartridges for its laser printers.27 Lexmark developed microchips for both the 
toner cartridges and the printers so that Lexmark printers would reject any 
toner cartridges not containing a matching microchip.28 In addition, Lexmark 
carried out a price discrimination program for printer cartridges. 29  The 
“Regular Cartridge” was offered at full price, in which case, the buyer was 
not subject to any sale terms restricting reuse or resale of the cartridge.30 The 
“Program Cartridge” was offered at a discount of roughly twenty percent, 
subject to the single-use/no-resale restriction. 31  Buyers of the Program 
Cartridge could only return them to Lexmark.32 The defendant, Impression 
Products, Inc. (“Impression Products”) acquired used Program Cartridges in 
the United States and foreign countries after a third party had replaced their 
chips and refilled their toners.33 Impression Products imported the refilled 
Program Cartridges and the Regular Cartridges and sold them without 
Lexmark’s authorization.34 
Lexmark owns U.S. patents covering its printer cartridges.35 Lexmark 
discovered Impression Products’ activities and sued Impression Products for 
patent infringement.36  Impression Products moved to dismiss Lexmark’s 
claims on the grounds that Lexmark’s U.S. patents were exhausted by 
foreign sales of the imported cartridges and that Lexmark’s single-use/no-
resale restriction was invalid under patent law.37 
 
 27.  Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, 394–95 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 28.  Id. at 395. 
 29.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 727–28 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
 30.  Id. at 727. 
 31.  Id. at 727–28. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. at 729. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 728. 
 36.  Id. at 728. 
 37.  See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, 9 F. Supp. 3d 830, 831 (S.D. Ohio 
2014); see also Civil Action at *3, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, 9 F. Supp. 3d 
830 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (No. 1: 10-CV-564), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41045. 
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As to international patent exhaustion, the District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio concluded that foreign sales did not exhaust U.S. patents.38 
The district court concluded that Jazz Photo was still good law and Kirtsaeng 
was not a relevant authority for the following reasons: Kirtsaeng was largely 
decided through interpretation of the Copyright Act; the Supreme Court did 
not discuss the issue of international patent exhaustion in Kirtsaeng; and 
patents are subject to the territoriality principle, which makes the concept of 
international exhaustion especially unsuitable to patents.39 
Conversely, the district court granted Impression Products’ motion to 
dismiss based on the ground that single-use/no-resale restriction could not 
prevent patent exhaustion.40 The court concluded that the Return Program 
was invalid as a post-sale restriction under Quanta.41 The court reasoned that 
a contrary holding would create uncertainties to a third-party purchaser who 
obtained the cartridge through an authorized foreign sale.42 
2. The Federal Circuit: Territoriality and Patentees’ Freedom to 
Contract 
With respect to the issue of international patent exhaustion, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court.43 The court concluded that international 
patent exhaustion should not apply to goods sold in a foreign country, even 
if the sale was authorized by a U.S. patent owner.44 
In refusing to recognize international patent exhaustion, the majority 
stated that patent rights are especially territorial and that foreign markets are 
not the predictable equivalent of the U.S. market in which patent holders 
have exclusivity.45 According to the Federal Circuit opinion, a foreign sale 
was not reasonably viewed as the reward guaranteed by U.S. patent law 
because laws and regulations vary from country to country.46 The Federal 
Circuit also reasoned that overruling Jazz Photo would disrupt industry 
 
 38.  Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 832–35.  
 39.  Id. at 832–38. 
 40.  Civil Action at *23–24, Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, 9 F. Supp. 3d 830 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (No. 
1: 10-CV-564), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41045. 
 41.  Id. at *21–24. 
 42.  Id. at *23–24. 
 43.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 762 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 44.  Id. at 762–765. 
 45.  Id. at 762–65 (citing Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890)). 
 46.  The court stated that the Patent Act must guarantee the patentees’ ability to prevent buyers from 
bringing a patented article into the United States and selling or using it to satisfy a U.S.-market demand 
that the patentee could otherwise help satisfy at U.S.-market prices. Id. 
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practices.47 The court concluded that Kirtsaeng is not a persuasive authority 
given that Kirtsaeng is derived from the common law disfavor toward 
restraints on the alienation of personal property.48 
On the issue of post-sale restriction, the majority disagreed with the 
district court and held that, by employing a post-sale use restriction, patent 
owners can successfully avoid patent exhaustion.49 The court distinguished 
Quanta on the ground that the case did not involve a patentee’s sale or a 
single-use/no-resale restriction.50 
In particular, the majority emphasized the language in Section 271 of 
the Patent Act “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention.”51 The court concluded that the sales subject to the 
Return Program did not cause patent exhaustion because, when a patent 
owner expressly denies a buyer’s ability to reuse or resale products, 
“authority” to use or sell is absent.52 In the majority’s view, the common law 
prohibition against restraints on the alienation of personal property has 
become “background,” and personal property is not free from restraints on 
the alienation or use.53 
Judge Dyk wrote that the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that 
imposition of post-sale restrictions cannot effectively overcome patent 
exhaustion, and that the unilateral imposition of geographical limitations to 
the buyers’ use cannot be upheld.54 
 
 47.  Id. at 770–73. 
 48.  Id. at 759.  
 49.  Id. at 739, 742. 
 50.  Id. at 737. 
 51.  Id. at 726. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or 
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent.” 
 52.  Impression Prods., 816 F.3d at 730. 
 53.  Id. at 751 (“Some of the numerous, distinct common-law jurisdictions, including Lord Coke’s, 
have departed at various times from the background rule expressed by Lord Coke.”). 
 54.  Id. at 787 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
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B. The Prohibition Against Servitudes on Chattels and Exhaustion 
of Intellectual Property Rights 
1. The Alienability of Property and the Law of Servitudes 
a. Rationales for the Common Law Prohibition against Servitudes 
It has been “a fundamental tenet” of property law that property should 
be alienable.55 Courts do not allow parties to impose restraints that would 
deter alienability of property.56 As a result, in England and the United States, 
courts have simplified interests in land by removing substantive restraints on 
alienation.57 
As the modern economy gave rise to multiple conflicting interests over 
a single piece of property, more specifically crafted rules were desired to 
deal with diverse transactions.58 The rules have been devised to allow owners 
of property to derive maximal benefits without unduly interfering with the 
ability of others to exercise their own entitlements. 59  Therefore, rules 
promoting certain systemic goals have been established.60 
In the United States, when an innocent third party purchases personal 
property from a thief or someone without authority to sell, the traditional rule 
has been that the innocent purchaser cannot obtain a valid title.61 To enhance 
the certainty of trade and the alienation of products, courts have protected 
innocent purchasers and treated possession as quasi-ownership of property.62 
In a case that involved one family in South Carolina who had possessed 
historical documents from the Civil War era, the Fourth Circuit held that 
“actual possession is, prima facie, evidence of legal title in the possessor” to 
resolve impenetrable difficulties to locate title, promote stability, and protect 
settled expectations.63 
 
 55.  JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 10 (2d ed. 2005). 
 56.  Id. at 11; see Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013) (citing Lord 
Coke’s description of the common law disfavor of restraints on the alienation of chattels). 
 57.  Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in Anglo-American Trust Law, 10 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN L. 355, 356 (2009). 
 58.  SINGER, supra note 55, at 12. 
 59.  SINGER, supra note 55, at 12. 
 60.  For example, rules against contracts that disregard human dignity, rules maintaining the 
functionality of markets, and antitrust regulations preserving other public interests are included. SINGER, 
supra note 55, at 12.  
 61.  SINGER, supra note 55, at 809. 
 62.  Id. at 16; see also Herbert v. Mechs. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n of New Brunswick, 17 N.J. Eq. 497, 
499–500 (1864); 2 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
713 (photo. reprint 1986) (1642). 
 63.  Willcox v. Stroup, 467 F.3d 409, 412–14 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing EDWARD COKE, 1 
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 6. b. (photo. reprint 1986) (19th ed. 1832)). But see Solomon R. 
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Most of the industrialized countries have implemented a system to 
protect a bona fide purchaser of property.64 Roman law, which favors a true 
owner, has survived in the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and 
Germany.65 Roman law generally allowed an innocent party to perfect title 
through a process known as usucaption, a device similar to adverse 
possession.66 The process of usucaption allowed a person who obtained title 
by a defective conveyance to perfect his title by holding property for a 
stipulated period.67 On the other hand, Germanic law, which protects a good 
faith purchaser who bought goods from a non-owner seller in the open 
market (“market overt”), remained mostly effective in other parts of 
continental Europe.68 Thus, U.S. courts have afforded a lesser degree of 
protection for a good faith purchaser compared with courts that have adopted 
the market overt theory.69 
In addition to the protection under common law, such as the quasi-
ownership treatment of possession of personal property, the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) has provided an augmented safeguard for a 
good faith purchaser.70 The U.C.C. has introduced the buyer in the ordinary 
course of business (“BOCB”) as a uniformly applicable protection of 
buyers.71 Through protection of a purchaser’s reasonable reliance on the 
 
Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 321 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the burden of proving that 
goods was not stolen rests with a third-party purchaser). 
 64.  See Derek Fincham, Towards A Rigorous Standard for the Good Faith Acquisition of 
Antiquities, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 145, 206 n73. (2010); see, e.g., MINPŌ [Civil. Code.] 1896 
art. 192 (Japan) (“[a] person who commences the possession of movables peacefully and openly by a 
transactional act acquires rights to exercise with respect to such movables immediately if she is in good 
faith and faultless.”). 
 65.  Hab Wojciech Kowalski, Purchase of a stolen work of art, Legal Convergence in THE 
ENLARGED EUROPE OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 89, 91–94 (Paul Torremans ed., 2000). 
 66.  Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 43, 65 (1987).  
 67.  Id. 
 68.  See Kowalski, supra note 65; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws 
of Good Faith Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1372–73 (2011) (stating that jurisdictions that have 
a system similar to the market overt include Brazil, Canada (Quebec), China, France, Germany, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, and Spain). 
 69.  See Peter M. Smith, Valediction to Market Overt, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 225, 225–26 (1997) 
(explaining that the market overt doctrine was known in colonial America, but ultimately came to be 
wholly rejected by the American courts).  
 70.  See U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); see also SINGER, supra 
note 55, at 809. 
 71.  Id. 
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appearance of authority, the U.C.C. has enhanced the market reliability in 
the United States.72 
Both the presumption of possessors’ good title to goods and the BOCB 
provision serve to facilitate alienation of personal property, and reflect the 
heightened need for the smooth and reliable commerce in personal 
property.73 
b. The Law of Servitudes 
Servitudes are nonpossessory interests in property, 74  which bind 
successors in the ownership of property.75 Related but different interests are 
a license and a leasehold. A license is a nonpossessory interest, as with a 
servitude,76 but it is revocable and it does not bind successors.77 Notably, if 
a licensee reasonably relies on a promise of a licensor and invests a 
significant amount of money, a license will become not freely revocable and 
even permits a licensee to exclude third-party infringers.78 A leasehold is 
similar to a servitude because it binds a landlord’s successors in interest and 
allows a tenant to use the subject matter of a leasehold.79 However, it is 
different from a servitude because it is a possessory interest.80 A leasehold is 
also distinguishable from a servitude because it lasts usually for a specific 
time period or an unspecified period with periodic rent payment.81 
Initially, common law courts refused to enforce servitudes that bind 
future generations.82 Courts were reluctant to recognize servitudes out of 
concerns that, “because of their longevity, servitudes would adversely affect 
the value of the burdened parcels” and might affect marketability of 
property.83 Additionally, allowing owners to disaggregate the sticks in the 
 
 72.  The Owner’s Intent and the Negotiability of Chattels: A Critique of Section 2-403 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 72 YALE L. J. 1205, 1206 (1963) (explaining that the Code broadened the 
entrusting doctrine). 
 73.  Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward A Theory of Priorities in 
Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 106–09 (1991). 
 74.  SINGER, supra note 55, at 181. 
 75.  THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 983 (2d ed. 
2012). 
 76.  Id. at 184–86. Licenses may be deemed irrevocable and treated like an easement if a licensee 
invests substantially in reasonable reliance on the license. 
 77.  8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 64.02(a)–(b), at 2–4 (David A. 
Thomas ed., 2005). 
 78.  Id. § 64.02(b) at 5. 
 79.  Id. § 42.03(a) at 288. 
 80.  Id. § 40.01 at 4. 
 81.  SINGER, supra note 55, at 437. 
 82.  MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 75, at 1026. 
 83.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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bundle of ownership rights may create numerous encumbrances and hurt the 
marketability of property.84 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, large-scale urban and suburban 
developments have taken place and the use of servitudes has become a 
customary practice.85 Therefore, a court of equity has recognized equitable 
servitudes as far as land is concerned, if the following requirements are met: 
the parties intend to create servitudes; the covenant touches and concerns the 
land; and there is notice to a successor in interest.86 
Given the need to achieve a rapid and larger volume of transaction in 
personal property, even the court of equity did not recognize servitudes with 
regards to personal property.87 In England, courts reasoned that an agreement 
to pay royalties in exchange for a transfer of title is nothing but an executory 
contract, enforceable only at law.88 To promote “the score of justice and 
mercantile convenience,” courts held that a purchaser of any right, in its 
nature transmissible (whether a right in rem or a right in personam), acquires 
a right free from all equities of which he had no notice at the time of its 
acquisition.89 In parallel to real property servitudes, courts have refused to 
recognize servitudes on personal property, and have simplified the possible 
conflicting interests over personal property.90 
In the early 20th century, however, some lower courts held that 
restrictions upon the use and alienation of items imposed by intellectual 
property right owners amounted to an equitable servitude in favor of the 
owners’ goodwill and business as dominant tenements. 91  One of the 
difficulties in finding a valid servitude on personal property is the 
 
 84.  SINGER, supra note 55, at 184. 
 85.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. a. 
 86.  See Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143; see also MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 75, at 
1040. 
 87.  See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 910, 925 (2008) 
(introducing Professor Zechariah Chafee’s observation of the general antipathy toward post-sale restraints 
on personal property, and explaining that the absence of a recording system may have been one of the 
reasons). But see Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2004) 
(stating that if restraints are valid for real property, they should be valid, pari passu, for personal property). 
 88.  E.g., In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1931) (quoting In Re 
Grant Richards (1907) 2 Q.B. 33). 
 89.  J. B. Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1887) (“Nor is it essential 
that the innocent purchaser obtain the entire legal interest in the property, either in quantity or duration. 
The purchaser of an aliquot part of the estate, the grantee for value of a rent charge, or the lessee for value, 
may keep the interest actually acquired from the fraudulent legal owner.”). 
 90.  See id.; see also Getzler, supra note 57, at 38. 
 91.  See In re Waterson, 48 F.2d at 707 (royalty payment in copyright); see also Nadell & Co. v. 
Grasso, 346 P.2d 505 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (restriction of label use to protect goodwill). 
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requirement of dominant tenement.92 In Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, the court 
concluded that the dominant tenement requirement is satisfied if there are 
protectable business interests such as goodwill.93 
Likely because of the dominant tenement requirement, most of the cases 
in which courts found servitudes on personal property were intellectual 
property cases.94 The position for creating servitudes on personal property 
never gained popularity.95 
2. Intellectual Property and Equitable Servitudes 
a. Technology License: A Perplexing and Mixed Entity 
Intellectual property rights, such as patents and copyrights, are 
enforceable against any unauthorized third parties when they infringe the 
intellectual property owner’s statutory rights.96 To avoid liability, users and 
sellers of patented goods or copyrighted materials need to obtain a 
permission from the owner, usually in a form of a license agreement.97 
Generally, a license of a technology may be defined as a grant of 
permission to practice a patent. 98  In technology licensing, there are 
distinctive features that are not shared with a “license” of real property or 
personal property. 99  In one aspect, a licensor and a licensee stand in a 
relationship akin to the relationship between a tenant and a landlord: both of 
the parties bear ongoing contractual duties, the agreement lasts usually for a 
specific period of time, and the grant is generally not freely revocable unless 
agreed otherwise.100 A licensee may even have a right to sublicense or sue 
 
 92.  See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 75; see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on 
Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928) [hereinafter Chafee, Equitable Servitudes]. 
 93.  Nadell & Co., 346 P.2d 509–10 (citing Professor Chafee’s suggestion that the imposition of 
restraints upon the resale price or the use of products may create a proprietary interest in the products for 
the benefit of the licensor’s business as a dominant tenement). 
 94.  See SINGER, supra note 55, at 425–29; see also In re Waterson, 48 F.2d at 708. 
 95.  Am. Bell, Inc. v. Fed’n of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 887 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that few 
courts embraced the concept). 
 96.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
 97.  ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND 
APPLICATION 4 (2008). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  PATRICK D. O’REILLY & BRIAN D. KACEDON, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 21 
(8th ed. 2015) (explaining that the definition of license under property law does not fit neatly to the 
technology license). 
 100.  Id. at 197–312 (various types of obligations and rights of licensors and licensees), 367–75 (the 
term and termination of license agreements). 
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infringers.101 As such, the relationship between a licensor and a licensee 
resembles the tenant-landlord relationship to some extent. 
More precisely, the relationship between a licensor and a licensee is 
affected and determined by the type of the license that has been granted. 
Exclusive technology licenses convey certain ownership interests over the 
technology, while nonexclusive licenses don’t convey such interests. 102 
Because the Patent Act affords protection to a patentee by way of exclusion 
of competitors, a party who holds one or more of exclusionary rights has 
standing to sue. 103  Exclusive licensees may have substantially all rights 
under a patent and have standing to sue infringing parties.104 
The degree of variance in license arrangements is notable in other 
aspects as well. Intellectual property holders frequently sell a tangible 
medium in addition to granting a license to use information. 105  These 
agreements are hybrid in a sense that a licensee obtains not only information 
but also an ownership interest over the tangible medium.106 The licensee may 
seek remedies under the U.C.C. if the contract is predominantly a sale.107 
b. Are Restrictions on Licensed Goods Servitudes? 
Because it is fairly common to impose restrictions on the use and sale 
of copyrighted or patented products, Professor Van Houweling examined 
whether these restraints may be analogized to servitudes on personal 
property, and attempted to explain restraints on the use of software program 
within the framework of a servitude.108 Professor Van Houweling concluded 
 
 101.  Id. at 37–52, 81–85 (standing to sue). 
 102.  Alice Haemmerli, Why Doctrine Matters: Patent and Copyright Licensing and the Meaning of 
Ownership in Federal Context, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 45 (2006) (stating that an exclusive copyright 
license is a legal title in the copyright and an exclusive patent license is an equitable, beneficial ownership 
interest in the patent). 
 103.  WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that an 
exclusive licensee in a specific field of use had standing to sue even though third parties had rights to 
sublicense for other uses), reh’g en banc denied by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4442 (2011). 
 104.  See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991), reh’g denied by 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28620 (1991). But see Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 
U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (holding that a mere license gives the licensee no title in the patent, and no right to 
sue at law).  
 105.  See Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853, 918 (1986) (observing that an increasing number of jurisdictions have 
extended article 2 to non- sale transactions such as leases and bailments). 
 106.  See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Hybrid Transactions and the INTERNET of Things: Goods, Services, or 
Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017) (concluding that a functionality approach may be a 
preferred method for evaluating IOT hybrid transactions). 
 107.  Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742–43 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding 
that the essence of the contract was for sale of goods). 
 108.  Van Houweling, supra note 87, at 889–90. 
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that restraints in licensing agreements should be valid as servitudes if 
restraints are beneficial for future users and waive some of the unnecessary 
limitations on reuse that copyright law itself imposes against the world.109 
Professor Van Houweling’s accounts are enlightening in suggesting that 
restraints in licensing agreements may be equated to servitudes on personal 
property depending on the terms of the agreements. 
On the other hand, Professor Zechariah Chafee examined U.S. case law 
that discussed servitudes on personal property and wrote that “[t]he attempt 
to impose equitable servitudes by notices has fared just as badly as the 
method of subcontracts” and that price maintenance against sub-purchasers 
“has been decisively repudiated by the Supreme Court even when applied to 
the subject matter of statutory monopolies.” 110  According to Professor 
Chafee’s accounts, equitable servitudes were rejected by courts, and antitrust 
law disallowed restrictions imposed by intellectual property owners.111 
As the subsequent discussion shows, the Supreme Court has developed 
the exhaustion doctrine and prevented post-sale restraints on articles 
imposed by intellectual property right holders.112 Then, the crucial question 
to be answered is the test for exhaustion when an intellectual property owner 
imposes restraints on the use and alienation of products that contain 
information. As a judicially-made equitable defense, intellectual property 
exhaustion involves assessment of various factors that courts consider in 
order to promote systemic goals, such as rules against contracts that 
disregard human rights, rules maintaining the marketability of property, and 
maintenance of competition.113 
Importantly, equity came into existence to supplement common law.114 
The common law prohibition against restraints on the alienation of property, 
and the protections of bona fide purchasers, remain as fundamental 
principles.115 To preserve the sense of justice, especially when confronted 
with the borderless economy and the emergence of transactions with 
globally-structured intellectual property interests, courts have turned to a 
 
 109.  Id. at 949. 
 110.  Chafee, Equitable Servitudes, supra note 92, at 954–55. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). 
 113.  See infra Part II Sections C and D.  
 114.  William Hamilton Bryson, Equity and Equitable Remedies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. 
JUDICIAL SYS. (Scribner 1987).  
 115.  See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 518; Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 
U.S. 519, 538–40, (2013). 
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more qualified test that is suited for examination of multiple conflicting 
interests.116 
c. The Source of Intellectual Property Exhaustion 
Copyright and patent exhaustion have been created as an embodiment 
of the common law prohibition against servitudes, but at the same time, it 
has been associated with ad hoc considerations at equity.117 The first sale 
doctrine, copyright exhaustion, was recognized as an equitable defense in 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus. 118  The Supreme Court, expressing strong 
disfavor for restrictions on the future trade of sold books, affirmed the 
Second Circuit’s decision, which stated that, “[a] court of equity, therefore, 
would not be justified in enforcing the provisions of the copyright law, 
merely to prevent a sale of a copyrighted article.”119 In recognizing copyright 
exhaustion, the Supreme Court avoided unfair extension of the copyright 
holder’s control and exploitation from sold books. 120  In patents, courts 
exercise more care in the balancing analysis than in copyright exhaustion, 
and confine patentees’ monopoly rights within the scope essential to a 
reasonable reward. 121  In Bloomer v. McQuewan, the Supreme Court 
considered possible prejudicial consequences to an owner and a user of a 
patented product, and the objective of the patent term extension, and 
concluded that the grantee should be allowed to use the product continuously 
after the extension.122 
In patent and copyright exhaustion, courts have interpreted the 
Copyright Act and the Patent Act in such a way that existence of intellectual 
property rights would not result in injustice.123 In formulating a standard for 
intellectual property exhaustion, it would be helpful to understand how 
courts consulted equity principles and ruled on the validity of servitudes 
under property law, and examine their implications to the issue of intellectual 
 
 116.  See Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 541–44, 554–57. 
 117.  For patent exhaustion, see Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873) (common law); see 
also Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 680 (1846) (equity); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 550 
(1852) (equity). For copyright exhaustion, see Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908) 
(common law and equity); see also Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 689–92 (2d Cir. 1894) 
(common law). 
 118.  Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341. 
 119.  Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1906), aff’d, 210 U.S. 339. 
 120.  Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 349–51. 
 121.  E.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). 
 122.  Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 553 (“For it can hardly be maintained that Congress could lawfully deprive 
a citizen of the use of his property after he had purchased the absolute and unlimited right from the 
inventor”). 
 123.  See Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 349–51; see also Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 550. 
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property exhaustion. Additionally, it is important to appreciate the variety 
among license agreements: exclusivity of the license; variance in the parties’ 
obligations and rights; and the hybrid nature of license agreements.124 
One of the literatures that explain the modern law of servitudes is the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
(2000).125 Section 3.1 summarizes the rules on the validity of servitudes. 
According to the comment entitled “Historical note and rationale,” (1) a 
servitude that is arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious; (2) a servitude that 
unreasonably burdens a constitutional right; (3) a servitude that imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on the alienation; (4) a servitude that imposes 
restraints on the trade or competition; and (5) a servitude that is 
unconscionable, have been invalidated.126 Courts have held these restraints 
invalid on the ground that they violate public policy, after examining factors 
such as the nature of restraints, the impacts on future generations, and the 
extent of adverse effects.127 Because equity provides a relief from a decision 
made at law, equity is not a “literalistic system,” and the “textual limits of 
laws” have not constrained equity.128 In subsequent sections, cases that dealt 
with copyright exhaustion and patent exhaustion will be discussed using the 
factors that are relevant to the determination of the validity of restraints in 
the Restatement (Third) of Property. 
C. Copyright Exhaustion: The Rise of Equity 
1. Coupling the Alienability Principle with the Purpose of the 
Copyright Act 
In early exhaustion decisions, the focus of copyright exhaustion was the 
common law prohibition against restraints on the alienation of personal 
property and protection of interests of third-party buyers. 
Initially, courts simply applied the prohibition against servitudes on 
chattels in copyright exhaustion.129 In Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted books were salvaged after a fire in a storage 
facility and the plaintiff disposed of the damaged copies to a third party as 
paper stock.130 In spite of the restriction on the use and sale of copies and the 
 
 124.  See supra Section B.2.a. 
 125.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 126.  Id. § 3.1 cmt. a. 
 127.  Id. § 3.1 cmt. d. 
 128.  David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1852 (2013). 
 129.  See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908). 
 130.  Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 689–91 (2d Cir. 1894). 
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lack of satisfactory remuneration to the copyright owner, the Second Circuit 
ruled in favor of the defendant secondhand book dealer, who obtained the 
copies from unspecified book dealers. 131  The court concluded that the 
copyright owner could not have a remedy under copyright law because it 
parted with a title to the copy.132 Through copyright exhaustion, the court 
effectively balanced the copyright holder’s economic interests with public 
interests, such as furtherance of the alienation of chattels. 
Later court opinions followed the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Harrison.133 The Seventh Circuit applied the first sale doctrine in Doan v. 
American Book Co., and held that the purchasers of lawfully made copies 
have a right to rebind and re-cover them, amounting to a mere repair.134 
Noting that patent exhaustion applies to repaired goods, the court concluded 
that buyers of lawfully made copies have the right to repair as buyers of 
patented goods.135 
In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,136 the Supreme Court applied copyright 
exhaustion, and held that “a copyright owner cannot have a remedy under 
copyright law once the owner parted with a title to the copy.”137 Even though 
there was no statutory basis that conditioned the exercise of copyright upon 
the ownership of a copy, the Court linked the termination of a copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights to the transfer of ownership interest in a copy.138  
In Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme Court explained copyright exhaustion 
from several viewpoints.139 As a primary concern, the Court stressed the 
importance of alienation of copyrighted books, or the Copyright Act’s 
purpose to disseminate ideas.140 Next, the Court considered a potential harm 
to third-party purchasers if a copyright owner could sue them for copyright 
 
 131.  Id. at 691 (“Whenever he parts with that ownership, the ordinary incident of alienation attaches 
to the particular copy parted with in favor of the transferee, and he cannot be deprived of it.”).  
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See Kipling v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 120 F. 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1903); see also Werckmeister v. 
Am. Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 329–30 (2d Cir. 1904); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 23 (2d 
Cir. 1906).  
 134.  Doan v. Am. Book Co., 105 F. 772, 776–78 (7th Cir. 1901). 
 135.  Id. at 777. 
 136.  Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908). 
 137.  See Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894). 
 138.  Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341. 
 139.  Id. at 350–51. 
 140.  Id.  
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infringement. 141  Further, the Court considered competitive harm. 142 
Combining multiple public policy considerations, the Court concluded that 
there was a lawfully made and sold book.143 
In later cases, the Supreme Court examined whether copyright owners’ 
certain economic interests are relevant to copyright exhaustion. In United 
States v. Masonite Corp., the Supreme Court decided that remuneration to a 
right holder is not determinative to exhaustion. 144  In Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., the Court refused 
to give weight to the right holder’s interests in maintaining a price 
discrimination by prohibiting parallel imports.145 
Along with the Supreme Court precedents, the Third Circuit broadened 
the scope of exhaustion through the U.C.C.’s third-party protection.146 In 
Independent News Co. v. Williams, Independent News Co. required retailers 
to return book covers of unsold books and prohibited the sale of coverless 
books. The defendant bought coverless comic books that had been delivered 
to waste dealers. The Third Circuit applied the BOCB provision and ruled in 
favor of the defendant.147 
The protection of third-party purchasers was expanded in other aspects 
as well. In copyright, a purchaser who wishes to defend him- or herself by 
the first sale doctrine must prove that there was a sale and the subject of the 
sale was a lawfully made copy.148 Courts have flexibly interpreted these 
requirements and have found a sale of a lawfully made copy in spite of 
copyright owners’ contention.149 
In the field of software licensing, the Ninth Circuit established a three-
prong test for the determination of sale, and held that there was no sale in 
 
 141.  Id. at 350 (“[T]he copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to 
multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this 
case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no 
privity of contract”). 
 142.  Id. at 351. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (holding that the rights and welfare 
of the community must be effectually guarded in copyright law as much as in patent law). 
 145.  Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138–39, 153 (1998). 
 146.  Indep. News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 511–13, 517 (3d Cir. 1961) (“the ordinary incidents 
of alienation belonging alike to all property attach to the material object in the hands of the new owner; 
and that copy is no longer under the copyright law insofar as the purchaser’s right is concerned.”). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 149.  A minor alteration of original copies does not exclude application of the first sale doctrine. 
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 821 (D. Kan. 1989). 
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Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.150  In Adobe Systems v. Christenson, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that an alleged infringer bears the initial burden to come 
forward with evidence of lawful acquisition of title to a genuine copy of 
software, but held that to the extent that a copyright holder claims that the 
alleged infringer could not acquire title because the software was never sold, 
only licensed, the copyright holder must establish such a license or the 
absence of a sale.151 
These decisions demonstrate that copyright exhaustion has been 
broadly shaped in accordance with the common law prohibition against 
servitudes on chattels. In addition, courts have complemented the doctrine 
with public interest considerations, including the maintenance of a free 
market. 
2. Equity and International Copyright Exhaustion in Kirtsaeng 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. established the rule that U.S. 
copyright holders’ rights are exhausted after foreign sales.152  The Court 
reasoned that §109(a)’s language, its context, and the common law history 
of the first sale doctrine, taken together, favored a non-geographical 
interpretation.153 The Court decided on international copyright exhaustion 
mostly relying on the common law prohibition against servitudes on personal 
property.154 
Additionally, Kirtsaeng demonstrated the importance of equity 
considerations in copyright exhaustion.155 The facts of Kirtsaeng suggest 
that the exhaustion of the publisher’s copyrights conformed to the relevant 
equity principles. In Kirtsaeng, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”), a global 
publisher and owner of copyrights, used a foreign subsidiary to print and sell 
textbooks in Asian countries.156 Copies of foreign editions contained a notice 
that buyers could use them only in countries outside the United States.157 
 
 150.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1102–12 (9th Cir. 2010) (“three considerations that 
we may use to determine whether a software user is a licensee, rather than an owner of a copy. First, we 
consider whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is granted a license. Second, we consider 
whether the copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software. Finally, we 
consider whether the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions.”). 
 151.  Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 152.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525, 538–45 (2013). 
 153.  Id. at 520–51. 
 154.  Id. at 521 (“‘[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law,’ we 
must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.’”).  
 155.  Id. at 554–56. 
 156.  Id. at 525–26. 
 157.  Id. at 526. 
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Kirtsaeng asked his friends and family in Thailand to buy foreign edition 
textbooks and mail them to him so that he could sell them in the United 
States.158 
The illustrations in the Restatement (Third) of Property explain why the 
Court decided to apply international copyright exhaustion. 159  As to the 
constitutional right, if Kirtsaeng had been prohibited from reselling the 
textbooks in the United States, it would have unreasonably burdened 
Kirtsaeng’s freedom to disseminate expressive materials. Such conclusion 
would have adversely affected content providers’ freedom to serve content 
creators’ freedom of expression as well.160 By dismissing Wiley’s claim, the 
Court protected Kirtsaeng’s and other distributors’ freedom to disseminate 
educational materials at an affordable price.161  Also, if individuals were 
barred from importing foreign-sold books into the United States or reselling 
them in the United States, the circulation of books would be unreasonably 
hindered. 162  This would unduly restrain alienation of books and burden 
retailers engaging in transactions across the border.163 In addition, a global 
publisher’s maintenance of book prices may lead to a market control.164 
Thus, Wiley’s price discrimination could be viewed as creating an 
unreasonable restraint on trade and competition.165 The harm to the public 
caused by leaving the restraint in force would have been substantial, even if 
there had been potential benefits to Wiley.166 The reasoning provided in 
Kirtsaeng indicates that the Court recognized these circumstances as 
favoring international copyright exhaustion.167 
The foregoing analysis suggests the convergence of the common law 
doctrine and the holistic examination at equity. The weight of equity 
considerations might increase in copyright cases in the age of new media and 
borderless economy. 
 
 158.  Id. at 527. 
 159.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 160.  Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 555–56, (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court was rightly 
concerned with the possible consequence to libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, 
consumer-goods retailers, and museums). 
 161.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1(2) (burden on a fundamental 
constitutional right). 
 162.  Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 539 (“The ‘first sale’ doctrine also frees courts from the administrative 
burden of trying to enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily movable goods.”).  
 163.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1(3) (restraint on alienation). 
 164.  Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 552–53. (stating that antitrust laws ordinarily forbid market divisions).  
 165.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1(4) (restraint on trade or competition).  
 166.  Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 524–26. 
 167.  Id. at 552 (“no precedent suggesting a legal preference for interpretations of copyright statutes 
that would provide for market divisions.”). 
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D. Patent Exhaustion: A Device to Reach Equilibrium 
Section C described the importance of unrestrained alienation of 
copyrighted items in copyright exhaustion and the modest but noticeable role 
of equity considerations. Overall, patent exhaustion has been applied in a 
more nuanced fashion. Courts have balanced conflicting public interests to 
decide on patent exhaustion: on the one hand, the alienation of products must 
be promoted and competition should be maintained; on the other hand, a 
patentee is entitled to a reward for the invention. 168  Thus, although the 
common law prohibition against servitudes on chattels has never been 
abolished, equity has been the centerpiece in the analysis of patent 
exhaustion.169 
1. Projecting the Alienability Principle into the Patent Act 
Early patent exhaustion cases were decided in the same manner as 
copyright cases were handled. In Bloomer v. McQuewan, the Supreme Court 
concluded that a patent owner’s legal right against buyers of patented 
products should be governed by property law once the patentee has departed 
with a title to the product.170 The Court reasoned that when the product 
passed to the hands of a purchaser, it was no longer within the limits of a 
patent owner’s monopoly. 171  Bloomer’s holding is axiomatic to patent 
exhaustion because the Supreme Court held that a patentee must seek a 
remedy only under property law.172 The Court disallowed the patentee’s 
monopoly rights over sold goods even though the patentee did not expressly 
authorize the continuous use.173 
The relevance of the common law antipathy toward servitudes was 
further elucidated in Adams v. Burke.174  The opinion also indicated that 
patent exhaustion is theoretically the same doctrine with copyright 
 
 168.  Courts have attempted to determine what is the reasonable award for the patentee. See Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917); see also United States v. 
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 241–47 (1942). 
 169.  See Univis, 316 U.S. at 241–47. 
 170.  Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1852)  (“And when the machine passes to the 
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no 
longer under the protection of the act of Congress.”). 
 171.  Id. at 547–50, 553–54. 
 172.  Id. at 550 (stating that the user bought the article for the purpose of using it as long as it is fit 
for use and found to be profitable).  
 173.  Id. at 548–50. 
 174.  Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) (“[W]hen the patentee, or the person having his 
rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its 
use and he parts with the right to restrict that use.”). 
 
  
118 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:1 
exhaustion and made a reference to the “lawfully made and sold” 
requirement of copyright exhaustion.175 
In Adams, the Supreme Court concluded that the purchaser from a 
partial right holder had an unrestricted right to use the patented coffins 
regardless of the seller’s geographically limited authority.176 Adams included 
the examination of remuneration to the patentee in its patent exhaustion 
analysis,177 although remuneration to a copyright owner is not stringently 
sought in copyright exhaustion analysis.178 This has confused many litigants 
and spurred different interpretations of Adams. One interpretation is that 
exhaustion is not available unless a patentee has received satisfactory 
remuneration in exchange for the buyer’s right to “unrestricted” resale and 
use of goods.179 Another interpretation is that remuneration is not dependent 
on the patentee’s subjective intent or actual authorization, but it is defined 
by considerations of public interests such as the Patent Act’s objective.180 
The Court reasoned that the sale was completed with payment for the 
coffin and the legal title to the coffin was transferred to the purchaser, 
therefore, the patentee’s rights were exhausted.181 Thus, the Court did not 
require “remuneration to a patentee” as a separate element of patent 
exhaustion, and only required a “lawfully made and sold” product.182 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. 
clarified what Adams meant.183  The licensing scheme of Motion Picture 
Patents Co. (“Motion Picture”) required (i) that machines should bear a plate 
indicating that the acquirer’s use was under a “license,” 184  (ii) that the 
machines should play only motion pictures containing the patented 
invention, and (iii) that the machines should be sold at a fixed price.185 
 
 175.  Id. at 457. 
 176.  Id. at 456–57. 
 177.  Id. at 456 (“[T]he patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or 
consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is 
open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees.”); 
see also Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1859) (quoted in United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 
265, 278 (1942)) (stating that the promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts is the main 
object and reward of inventors is secondary and merely a means to that end). 
 178.  Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 278 (holding that the rights and welfare of the community must be 
effectually guarded in copyright law as much as in patent law). 
 179.  See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704–05, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 735–39, 752–53 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 180.  See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). 
 181.  Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 518.  
 184.  Id. at 506–08. 
 185.  Id.  
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Motion Picture sued the defendants when the machine was used in violation 
of the imposed conditions. 186  The Court considered the patentee’s 
contribution to the society, the proper reward to the patentee,187 and the 
possible harm to third-party acquirers,188 and concluded that the lawful sale 
of motion picture machines exhausted the patent.189 Thus, the Court clarified 
that the reward to the patentee was only one of many factors in patent 
exhaustion. 
Motion Picture Patents resolved the case largely by addressing the harm 
to public interests.190 In particular, Motion Picture Patents emphasized the 
antitrust consideration, and showed that patent exhaustion prevents 
unjustifiable expansion of monopoly rights. 191  Further included in the 
consideration was the playhouse’s freedom of expression.192 The opinion 
considered public interests related to patent exhaustion: alienability of 
goods; maintenance of competition; the patentee’s reward; and the purchaser 
playhouse’s freedom of expression as indicated in the Restatement (Third) 
of Property.193 
In a case that presented similar facts to Motion Picture Patents, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the patentee’s licensing scheme was merely a 
price fixing arrangement, and applied patent exhaustion. 194  The Court 
examined whether the license notice was a means designed in good faith to 
enable the plaintiff to make only reasonable and exclusive use of its 
invention, or a disguised attempt to control the price of its machines after 
they have been sold.195 Because the plaintiff had received payment for the 
machines, the Court ruled in favor of the defendant. 196  Straus v. Victor 
Talking Machine Co. teaches us that the alienation principle at common law 
has merged with public interest analysis.197 
Equity has extended the scope of patent exhaustion to repaired goods 
and consumable goods.198 For example, users of patented machines may 
 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 518. 
 188.  Id. at 508 (describing that forty-thousand machines were in use). 
 189.  Id. at 519. 
 190.  Id. at 518. 
 191.  Id. at 511. 
 192.  The court indicated that the restriction would give Motion Picture such a potential power for 
evil over an industry that serves for the amusement life of the nation. Id. at 519. 
 193.  See id. at 506–19; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 194.  Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 496 (1917). 
 195.  Id. at 498. 
 196.  Id. at 501. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 707 (1846). 
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repair them when needed, because there are public interests in preventing 
economic waste.199 Also, sellers of unpatented toilet paper are not liable for 
infringement of claims directed to mechanisms by which toilet paper was 
served to users if the patentee authorized the sale of the paper dispenser.200 
Against the foregoing line of decisions, General Talking Pictures Corp. 
v. Western Electric Co. did not apply patent exhaustion when a non-
exclusive licensee infringed a patent, by selling products for commercial use 
without the patentee’s permission, and the buyer was aware of the 
circumstances. 201  Unlike Motion Picture Patents, the manufacturer in 
General Talking Pictures sold products beyond the scope of its license, and 
the bad faith buyer actively participated in the infringement.202 The denial of 
exhaustion was conformant with equity principles because (i) as to the 
reward to the patentee, the patentee would have lost a significant part of 
profits earned from the royalty payment of exclusive licensees if the 
manufacturer and the bad faith purchaser could have made sales;203 (ii) the 
purchaser did not deserve protection by patent exhaustion because it induced 
the manufacturer’s infringement;204 and (iii) the patentee did not attempt to 
extend its monopoly right unreasonably.205 Thus, noting that the exclusive 
licensees and the patent owner should be able to exclude infringing activities 
by the non-exclusive licensee and the joint infringer, the Court held that the 
infringing sale did not constitute a lawful transfer of title to the goods.206 
Accordingly, patent exhaustion has been formulated, along with 
copyright exhaustion, as a combination of equity considerations and the 
common law servitude rule. 207 In patent exhaustion, the “lawfully made and 
sold” item requirement has been redefined through the analysis of public 
interests, including the preservation of a reasonable reward to a patentee. 208 
 
 199.  Id. (“The right to continue to use them will probably last . . . usually, with proper repairs, do 
service beyond that time”). 
 200.  Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 431 (1894). 
 201.  Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179–80 (1938). 
 202.  Id. at 179–82. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id.  
 206.   Id. 
 207.  See supra Part II. Section B. 
 208.  See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873); see also Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). 
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2. The Development of Patent Exhaustion at Equity 
Equity considerations will probably become more important in the 
analysis of modern patent disputes than in early patent exhaustion cases. 
Recently, patent exhaustion implicates a troubling issue such as patent 
thickets, the construction of sweeping patent portfolios by dominant 
companies. 209  By acquiring a large “patent portfolio,” which contains 
numerous patents and claims over the entire field of technology, patent 
owners may exclude competitors from the market or force competitors to 
accept a license.210 Patent exhaustion cases may present the need to redress 
the deleterious anticompetitive conducts by patent holding companies.211 
It is not uncommon for inventors and patentees to apply for patents 
containing multiple claims with slightly different coverage so that they can 
exclude a wide array of operations by their competitors.212 In United States 
v. Univis Lens Co., Univis Lens Company and Univis Corporation 
(“Univis”), the owners of patents, employed a licensing scheme, through 
which Univis sold lens blanks to licensees and the licensees agreed to sell 
them at prices fixed by Univis.213 The sole use of lens blanks was for the 
licensees to make eyeglasses with multifocal lenses. 214  Some of Univis 
patents covered the final step of making multifocal lens glasses after grinding 
and finishing lens blanks.215 Univis argued that if the licensed manufacturers 
sold lens blanks to an unlicensed finisher for completion of the lens blanks, 
the sale would constitute contributory infringement by the manufacturers.216 
On the other hand, the government argued that the grinding and polishing of 
the lens blanks did not involve a novel feature and that the statutory 
monopoly rights could not lawfully extend to a procedure that was not novel 
in and of itself even if the process was applied to make an article which 
embodied novel features of the invention.217 
Guided by the principles set forth in Motion Picture Patents and Adams, 
Univis considered the common law prohibition against restraints on the 
 
 209.  E.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 241–47 (1942). 
 210.  Kirti Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
827, 827–58 (2013).  
 211.  See, e.g., Univis, 316 U.S. at 252; Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 
(2008). 
 212.  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1627–29 
(2003). 
 213.  Univis, 316 U.S. at 243–47. 
 214.  Id. at 248–49. 
 215.  Id. at 246–47. 
 216.  United States v. Univis Lens Co., 41 F. Supp. 258, 264–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
 217.  Id. 
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alienation of personal property,218 a reward to a patent owner,219 and impacts 
to competition,220 and held that Univis’ sale of the lens blank to the finisher 
constituted “a grant of license” to practice the final stage of the patented 
process.221 
Simultaneously, Univis advanced the exhaustion doctrine in a few 
aspects. Firstly, the Court did not preclude patent exhaustion although Univis 
had not received royalty in consideration for the use of the asserted process 
claim.222 The Court made clear that examination of the reward to a patentee 
should not be formalistic, claim-based analysis.223 Secondly, to conclude that 
a product is lawfully made and sold, the Court articulated a more specific 
requirement in a situation like Univis,224 and held that if a sold product is 
only capable of practicing a patented method, and the product substantially 
embodies the patented method, the method patent is exhausted. 225 
Conceiving the new rule, the Court considered public interests such as the 
alienation of personal property, the reward to the patent owner, restraints on 
trade and competition, using a rationale that is similar to the rationale that 
underlies Bloomer v. McQuewan.226 
The Supreme Court further extended the equity’s reach in Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., and held that patent exhaustion is 
available to a third-party acquirer with notice of post-sale restrictions.227 The 
Court concluded that the authorized sale of an article that substantially 
embodies a patent exhausts the patent rights. 228  LG Electronics, Inc. 
(“LGE”), licensed Intel Corporation (“Intel”) to make, use, sell, offer to sell, 
import or otherwise dispose of chipsets and microprocessors but imposed a 
restriction that prevented a buyer from using Intel parts in combination with 
non-Intel memory and buses in ways that practice the LGE patents. 229 
 
 218.  Univis, 316 U.S. at 252 (“Whether the licensee sells the patented article in its completed form 
or sells it before completion for the purpose of enabling the buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally 
parted with the article, and made it the vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of the invention 
with respect to that article.”). 
 219.  Id. at 251 (explaining that the reward received by the patentee was for the article and the 
invention which the article embodied). 
 220.  Id. at 251–54. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 249–50. 
 223.  Id. at 251–54. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See id.; see also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 550 (1852) (applying exhaustion and 
holding that a licensee could continue to use patented machines after the patent term extension). 
 227.  Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008). 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. at 623. 
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Quanta Computer (“Quanta”), after receiving a notice of the restriction, 
manufactured computers by combining Intel and non-Intel components.230 
Intel’s sale of products that substantially embodied patented features 
exhausted LGE’s patents covering Quanta’s products.231 Along with Univis, 
the Court examined the facts at equity and found a lawfully made and sold 
product. 232  The Court concluded that, without patent exhaustion, public 
interests would be harmed by LGE’s attempt to end-run around 
exhaustion.233 Moreover, the Court applied exhaustion irrespective of the 
validity of the restraint. 234  Unlike the invalidated tying arrangement in 
Motion Picture Patents,235 the prohibitions against combining Intel products 
with non-Intel products were not held outside the scope of LGE’s patents, 
and the Court did not examine whether such restraint was anticompetitive or 
patent misuse.236 
In sum, patent exhaustion is not a different entity from copyright 
exhaustion because both have been developed through the common law 
prohibition against servitudes on chattels and equity principles.237 In patent 
exhaustion, the patentee’s receipt of reward for the invention has been one 
factor to support a “lawfully sold” item,238 and it can be found if the patentee 
has received what is reasonable for the invention, as determined by the public 
interest analysis. 239 
3. The Federal Circuit’s Reliance on Mallinckrodt and Jazz Photo 
in Impression Products 
In Impression Products, the Federal Circuit concluded that the common 
law prohibition against restraints on the alienation of chattels had become 
 
 230.  Id. at 623–24. 
 231.  Id. at 631–33, 638 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942)). 
 232.  Id. at 631–33. 
 233.  See id. at 629–30 (warning the danger of allowing an end-run around exhaustion if method 
claims are excused from patent exhaustion). 
 234.  Id. at 621. 
 235.  Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). 
 236.  Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 (2008) (patent exhaustion 
unrelated to the validity of a restraint). 
 237.  As for copyright exhaustion, see supra Part II Section C. For patent exhaustion, see Motion 
Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 506–08 (applying exhaustion despite the patentee’s restrictions on “license” 
to downstream purchasers of a machine from a licensee); see also United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 
U.S. 241, 249–50 (1942) (implying a license to use the last step of a method claim upon sale of a machine 
that substantially embodied the claim). 
 238.  See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873); see also Univis, 316 U.S. at 249–50. 
 239.  See Adams, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1859) (citing U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
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the background of patent exhaustion and denied the application of 
international patent exhaustion.240 The Federal Circuit’s description of the 
common law rule was inaccurate given the  Supreme Court holdings that 
have closely followed the common law prohibition against servitudes.241 For 
instance, the common law servitude rule was reconfirmed in Univis,242 albeit 
not the precedential part of Univis. 
Additionally, despite the Supreme Court’s general disallowance of 
post-sale restrictions, the Federal Circuit held that post-sale restrictions were 
valid if the restrictions were reasonably within the reward for the invention 
in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.243 
The Supreme Court has developed patent exhaustion in light of the 
common law servitude rule and has performed the multifactorial analysis in 
each case. In contrast, many of the Federal Circuit decisions emphasized the 
goal of securing a reward to a patentee244 and concluded that an “authorized 
sale” transfers to a buyer the ability to use and sell products in accordance 
with limitations set by a patent owner.245 On a few occasions, however, the 
Federal Circuit applied exhaustion in a more flexible manner so that the 
public policy concerns underlying the earlier precedents would not be 
disturbed.246 The Federal Circuit’s general trend to deviate from the Supreme 
Court rulings can be appreciated in the following points. 
a. Mallinckrodt and Post-Sale Restraints 
In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the patent owner, Mallinckrodt, 
sold its patented medical device to hospitals with accompanied “single use 
only” notice. 247  Mallinckrodt sued Medipart because hospitals sent the 
device to Medipart for servicing, which enabled the hospitals to use the 
device more than once. 248  The Federal Circuit held that the post-sale 
 
 240.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 750-52 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 241.  See Univis, 316 U.S. at 241, 252; see also Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638. 
 242.  See Univis, 316 U.S. at 252. 
 243.  Cf. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 701, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) with Quanta, 553 
U.S. at 638, and Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1917). 
 244.  Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702 (citing United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1992)), 
overruled by Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1523 (2017). 
 245.  See, e.g., Impression Prods., 816 F.3d at 750–52 (requiring the buyer’s authority to reuse and 
resell). 
 246.  See, e.g., LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(relaxing the authority-to-sell requirement). 
 247.  Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702. 
 248.  Id. 
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restrictions were valid and enforceable because the restrictions were 
reasonably within the reward which the patentee was entitled to.249 
The Federal Circuit devised a test for patent exhaustion by borrowing a 
language that appeared in United States v. General Electric Co.250 However, 
the Federal Circuit did not clearly explain why General Electric’s reasoning, 
which was grounded on the agency theory, could be applied to sales in 
general.251 Furthermore, in Mallinckrodt and Princo Corp. v. International 
Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit discussed patent exhaustion as if 
patent misuse were being discussed.252  
Although both patent exhaustion and patent misuse concern 
competition policy, patent exhaustion is a distinct doctrine from patent 
misuse. In patent exhaustion, courts consider factors that are not included in 
patent misuse, such as the common law prohibition against the sale and use 
of personal property.253 The Federal Circuit should not have precluded patent 
exhaustion just merely because it did not find an illegal anticompetitive 
agreement. 
Finally, Mallinckrodt was implicitly overruled by Quanta, which 
applied patent exhaustion even though the patentee imposed a post-sale 
restraint.254 As such, it was reasonably foreseeable, as Judge Dyk pointed 
out, that the Supreme Court would reverse the Federal Circuit’s opinion 
regarding post-sale restraints in Impression Products.255 
b. Jazz Photo and International Exhaustion 
Jazz Photo, citing Boesch v. Graff,256  ruled that foreign sales do not 
exhaust U.S. patents.257 Fuji Photo Film Co. (“Fuji Film”) brought an action 
under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 against importers on the ground 
that importation of used “single-use” cameras that were refurbished for reuse 
 
 249.  Id. at 704–05, 709.  
 250.  See id. at 708 (explaining the applicability of the rule in General Electric). However, see 
General Electric, 272 U.S. at 488–90 (stating that the agreement was an agency-like contract and the 
imposition of restrictions should be valid) for the reasoning of General Electric. 
 251.  Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. 
 252.  See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 705–08 (discussing “legality” of the restrictions and 
misuse); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing patent 
misuse in the reasoning for patent exhaustion). 
 253.  See supra Part II Sections D.1 and D.2. 
 254.  Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 (2008). 
 255.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 779-83 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Dyk, J., 
dissenting). 
 256.  Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890). 
 257.  Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001), overruled by Impression Prods., 
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2017). 
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in various overseas facilities constituted infringement of Fuji Film’s 
patents.258 However, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on Boesch was off the 
point given the difference in the facts of Boesch and Jazz Photo. 259  In 
Boesch, the defendants purchased the patented burners in Germany from a 
person having the right to sell them in Germany by operation of German 
patent law.260 Thus, Boesch’s refusal to apply patent exhaustion was based 
on the unique fact that  there was no sale or a title transfer from the patentee. 
In contrast, in Jazz Photo, the imported cameras were sold by Fuji Film.261 
Thus, Boesch cannot explain Jazz Photo’s denial of the adoption of 
international exhaustion. 
As Part III explains, the Federal Circuit should have adopted 
international patent exhaustion in light of the above-outlined Supreme Court 
precedents. 
4. The Supreme Court Opinion in Impression Products 
In Impression Products, the Supreme Court officially announced the 
adoption of international patent exhaustion and reiterated that a patent owner 
may not impose post-sale restrictions to avoid patent exhaustion,262 applying 
the common law servitude rule.263 Additionally, the Court clarified the scope 
of the doctrine with regards to “lawfully made and sold,” by differentiating 
the grant of a license to practice a patent from the conveyance of a title to a 
sold item.264 At least conceptually, the opinion provided guidance on the 
requirements of patent exhaustion and stated that, when a licensee  sells 
products with restrictions imposed by a licensor, the sale exhausts the 
licensor’s patent rights.265 Further, the opinion suggested that a buyer from a 
limited license holder may be protected unless the buyer knowingly 
participated in the infringement.266 
 
 258.  Id. at 1098. 
 259.  Id. at 1105. 
 260.  Boesch, 133 U.S. at 698–99.  
 261.  Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1102. 
 262.  Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1532–33. 
 263.  Id. at 1531–32. 
 264.  Id. at 1535–36 (“a license may require the licensee to impose a restriction on purchasers, like 
the license limiting the computer manufacturer to selling for non-commercial use by individuals.”). 
 265.  Id. at 1534–35 (explaining that a licensee’s sale of a product with the licensor-set restriction 
exhausts the patent). 
 266.  Id. at 1534. 
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a. Common Law Bars Restraints upon the Sale and Use of 
Personal Property as Lord Coke Described 
The Supreme Court denounced the Federal Circuit’s dismissive view of 
the common law prohibition against servitudes on personal property.267 In 
the Federal Circuit’s view, unlike copyright exhaustion, Congress 
consciously left out patent exhaustion from the Patent Act, 268  and the 
common law servitude rule became no more than “one common-law 
jurisdiction’s general judicial policy at one time toward anti-alienation 
restrictions.”269  In contrast, the Supreme Court emphasized the doctrinal 
equality between patent exhaustion and copyright exhaustion, and refused to 
isolate patent exhaustion from copyright exhaustion solely for the lack of 
statutory provision. 270  Again, the Court quoted Lord Coke’s account on 
servitudes on personal property under English common law,271 and held that, 
if a patent owner restricts the resale and use of an item after selling it, the 
restriction “is voide, because . . . it is against Trade and Traffique, and 
bargaining and contracting betweene man and man.”272 
In short, the Court reiterated the point made in Kirtsaeng’s international 
copyright exhaustion. 273  The common law servitude rule has been 
unmodified and has remained as a governing principle of patent and 
copyright exhaustion.274 
b. The Authority Argument was Unsuccessful 
While the Federal Circuit concluded that an express limitation on the 
authority of a seller can overcome presumption of the authority to sell goods, 
and excludes patent exhaustion, 275  the Supreme Court explained that 
exhaustion doctrine is not a presumption about the authority of a seller that 
comes along with a sale, but that it is a limit on “the scope of the patentee’s 
rights.”276  
In holding that a contractual limitation is not relevant to patent 
exhaustion, the opinion alluded to the fundamental difference between the 
 
 267.  Id. at 1532. 
 268.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 765–67 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 269.  Impression Prods., 816 F.3d at 750–52. 
 270.  Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1532–33, 1536. 
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 276.  Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1534. 
 
  
128 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:1 
implied license theory and patent exhaustion. 277  The Supreme Court 
reiterated the essence of patent exhaustion established by previous decisions: 
patent exhaustion limits a patentee’s right over sold products and safeguards 
important public interests, without regard to the restrictive terms in 
individual contracts.278 
As explained in Part II Section B, the rules designed to protect innocent 
third parties have assisted courts in finding a buyer’s valid title to personal 
property regardless of the limitations on sellers’ authority to sell.279 Statutory 
third-party protections, such as the BOCB provision, have offered another 
important mechanism to facilitate commercial transactions of personal 
property.280 
c. Protection of a Purchaser from a Limited License Holder 
According to Impression Products, patentees cannot use a license to 
impose post-sale restraints on purchasers.281 On the other hand, a patentee 
may bring a patent infringement action against a purchaser if the purchaser 
acquired an infringing product from a licensee with knowledge of patent 
infringement.282 
The Supreme Court contrasted a “license” of a patent with a “sale” of a 
patented product and confirmed that a license does not cause patent 
exhaustion because it does not pass title to a product.283 Acknowledging that 
the central questions to be answered are what constitutes a “sale,” and 
whether buyers can assert patent exhaustion when they have purchased 
goods that were sold or used beyond the licensee’s “authority,” the Court 
explained why Motion Picture Patents reached a different conclusion from 
General Talking Pictures even though both dealt with a purchaser from a 
limited-authority licensee.284 The Court indicated that the norm is patent 
exhaustion, as decided in Motion Picture Patents, and that General Talking 
Pictures is quite limited in scope.285 
General Talking Pictures held that a patent owner can exclude a third-
party purchaser from commercially leasing patented products if the 
 
 277.  See id. at 1534–35; supra Part II Section D.2. 
 278.  See id. at 1531–35; supra Part II Sections D.1, D.2. 
 279.  See supra Part II Section B. 
 280.  See supra Part II Section B. 
 281.  Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1534–35. 
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purchaser has knowingly acquired the products from a non-exclusive 
licensee who is not authorized to sell them for commercial use.286 Unlike 
Adams and Motion Picture Patents, the licensee in General Talking Pictures 
lacked the authority to sell amplifiers for general commercial purpose, and 
the buyer had knowledge that the sale of amplifiers constituted patent 
infringement.287 On the other hand, in Motion Picture Patents, the Court 
concluded that the “sale” of machines exhausted the patent, 288  although 
Motion Picture limited its licensee’s authority and provided notice.289 The 
Supreme Court categorized General Talking Pictures as an exception to 
patent exhaustion on the ground that the defendant in General Talking 
Pictures was a joint infringer.290  Thus, the Court determined that patent 
exhaustion is not available to a joint infringer, who “actively induces the 
infringement of a patent.”291 
Section 271(b)’s active inducement was interpreted in Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., where the Court held that active inducement 
requires a showing of the defendant’s “willful blindness” and it may be found 
when the defendant (1) subjectively believes that there is a high probability 
that a patent exists and that the defendant’s acts infringe that patent; and (2) 
takes deliberate actions to avoid learning about those facts.292  Thus, the 
Court decided that General Talking Pictures is distinguishable from Motion 
Picture Patents because General Talking Pictures presented facts that 
supported these elements. 
In contrast to General Talking Pictures, Kirtsaeng and Quanta 
protected a third-party purchaser who had knowledge of post-sale 
restrictions.293  Then, the denial of patent exhaustion in General Talking 
Pictures is not based on the purchaser’s ex post facto knowledge of the lack 
of authority in the seller, but the purchaser’s knowing inducement of the 
seller’s patent infringement. 
 
 286.  Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179–80 (1938). 
 287.  Id. at 179–82. 
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d. Patentees’ Interests in the Price Discrimination 
As to the patentees’ interests in obtaining a separate payment in the 
United States for a product sold abroad, the Court refused to give any 
weight.294 The Court considered injustice that arises from double recovery, 
and stated that a patentee might not be able to command a particular price or 
a reward for one item more than once. 295  Because the Supreme Court 
previously rejected the same argument in Kirtsaeng and Quality King 
Distributors., Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., the conclusion was 
an expected one.296 
e. Territoriality and Boesch 
The Court concluded that the Federal Circuit’s territoriality opinion 
could not be upheld. 297  The Court rejected Lexmark’s emphasis on the 
territoriality principle,298 and distinguished Boesch v. Graff for the absence 
of sale that was attributable to the patent owner.299 The Court held that the 
territoriality of a patent does not support the Federal Circuit conclusion 
because patent exhaustion is a matter of public policy, an equitable limitation 
placed after the patent was originally granted.300 
III. ARGUMENT: WHAT SHOULD BE THE TEST IN PATENT 
EXHAUSTION? 
Part II Section B showed that the Supreme Court has faithfully applied 
the common law disfavor for equitable servitudes on personal property. Even 
when personal property is the subject of intellectual property rights, the 
Court has not accepted post-sale restraints as a way to restrict the use and 
sale of the sold item. Sections C and D explained that the common law rule 
has effectively protected the freedom of buyers because courts have flexibly 
applied patent and copyright exhaustion, using the multifactorial public 
interest analysis. 
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A. The Proposal of a Two-Step Test 
In line with the Supreme Court’s precedents on intellectual property 
exhaustion, I propose that the analysis of patent exhaustion should be divided 
into two levels: the first analysis concerns the common law prohibition 
against servitudes; and the second analysis is conducted using equity 
principles. 
The first inquiry asks whether the case requires effective protection of 
third-party purchasers.301 This question concerns the classic form of patent 
exhaustion, and examines the applicability of the common law prohibition 
against restraints on the use and alienation of chattels.302 This stage is guided 
by the property law principles because whereabouts of an ownership interest 
to a particular item is at issue. Thus, courts will consider application of any 
statute that provides third-party purchaser protection with regards to title 
acquisition,303 such as presumption of good title in possessors of property. A 
sale to a third party may be found even if the agreement between parties is 
called license.304 The burden-shifting method employed in Adobe Systems v. 
Christenson may be used.305 
At the next stage, courts should examine facts of the case using the 
relevant equity principles, and determine whether there is a lawfully made 
and sold copy for the application of patent exhaustion. Equity will scrutinize 
any harm to public interests, including competitive injury, restraints on the 
alienation of articles, interference with a constitutional right, and 
arbitrariness of enforcement.306 
Most of the time, litigants disagree on whether the sold item was 
“lawfully made and sold.”307 Courts have broadened the concept of “lawfully 
made and sold,” for example, in the following aspects: (1) when a patentee 
imposes restraints on the sale or use of an item and an item is sold in violation 
of the restraints, the item can be still considered lawfully made and sold if 
the restraints are invalid as anticompetitive; 308  (2) absence of royalty 
payments with regards to the asserted patents does not necessarily preclude 
a finding that a product is lawfully made and sold and the patentee has 
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received a reward;309 (3) sales of products that substantially embody the 
patented invention satisfy the requirement for claims that are directed to the 
same invention.310 If a patentee had an opportunity to receive an agreed-upon 
price or a reasonable return for the use of the invention, patent rights are 
exhausted.311 
In addition, post-sale restrictions that unreasonably burden the 
alienation of products do not prevent patent exhaustion.312 Adams held that 
the seller’s limited authority did not prevent application of patent exhaustion 
even when the sold coffin was used in areas beyond the seller’s authorized 
area. 313  Motion Picture Patents and Bloomer similarly applied patent 
exhaustion in spite of the restrictions that limited the authority of a 
licensee. 314  Impression Products suggested that a buyer from a limited 
authority licensee may be protected unless the buyer has jointly infringed the 
patent.315 
On the other hand, patent rights are not exhausted, as decided in 
General Talking Pictures and Boesch, when a patentee has been deprived of 
an opportunity to receive a reasonable payment that is ordinarily obtainable, 
or when a third party acquired an item with knowledge of patent 
infringement.316 When a third party has knowingly obtained goods from an 
infringing nonexclusive licensee who cannot sell goods for commercial use, 
the denial of patent exhaustion will not harm the alienation of property nor 
cause injury to competition. 
Other factors have been proposed for inclusion into the analysis of 
patent exhaustion. For example, the presence of notice of a post-sale 
restriction has been proposed as one factor to be considered.317 Professor 
Van Houweling compared personal property servitudes with real property 
servitudes and suggested that restrictions on personal property may be more 
enforceable in that they do not purport to extend into the future generations 
of chattel owners.318 Professor Van Houweling wrote that when buyers are 
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on notice, judicial second-guessing of voluntary transaction is not necessary 
because social costs of servitudes such as harms to purchasers and 
competitive injury will not be significant given the availability of antitrust 
actions.319 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, several cases highlight a potential 
problem with the above approach that categorically allows imposition of 
restraints with notice.320 First, a notice on an item may be removable by third 
parties. Thus, even when there is a notice on an item, information costs may 
not be ignored. Second, the Supreme Court has provided an answer to this 
issue both in copyright law and in patent law. Kirtsaeng held that notice of 
the geographical limitations on the use of textbooks cannot preclude 
international copyright exhaustion. 321  In Quanta, the Supreme Court 
concluded that patent exhaustion is available to a third-party acquirer who 
had notice of post-sale restrictions.322 Third, owners of personal property 
may move from state to state or move to a foreign country. The initial 
presence of notice about the geographical limitation may not be sufficient to 
inform a third-party acquirer in a foreign country who has no connection 
with the country of origin. Accordingly, given that protection of third-party 
purchasers is of paramount importance for the stable development of global 
commerce, courts should not exclude patent exhaustion because of the 
presence of a notice to third-party acquirers. 
Therefore, the denial of patent exhaustion, as decided in General 
Talking Pictures, was limited to cases where the defendant was a joint 
infringer, acting with actual knowledge or willful blindness regarding the 
limitation of the licensee’s authority.323 The elements of joint infringement 
liability set forth in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. may be 
relevant to the determination of patent exhaustion.324 
B. Application to Impression Products 
Impression Products recognized international patent exhaustion based 
on the understanding that the common law prohibition against servitudes is 
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the essence of patent exhaustion,325 and that patents are not different from 
copyrights.326 The Court also reconfirmed that post-sale restrictions are not 
effective to prevent patent exhaustion.327  If the proposed two-tier test is 
applied, courts would recognize international patent exhaustion regardless of 
Lexmark’s express prohibition against the use of cartridges within the United 
States. Additionally, the single-use/no-resale restriction and notice of it to 
buyers would not preclude patent exhaustion under the test. 
The first stage addresses the property law aspect of patent exhaustion, 
and examines the applicability of the common law prohibition against 
restraints on the alienation of chattels.328  Impression Products presented 
facts that demanded stronger protection of third parties through the 
application of the common law rule. The cartridges were sold in large 
numbers worldwide.329 The altered cartridges were indistinguishable from 
original cartridges except that they were reprogrammed and refilled.330 The 
buyers of the cartridges were title holders with full dominion over them.331 
To maintain the certainty of trade and prevent unforeseeable injury to third 
parties, the buyers should have a right to use and sell the cartridges without 
infringement liability. Thus, the common law prohibition against servitudes 
on personal property should prevent Lexmark’s attempt to restrict the use 
and resale of the cartridges that were sold to third parties.332 
Second, through the multifactorial public interest analysis, courts 
should find that the cartridges have been lawfully made and sold. As decided 
in Adams, a reward to a patentee may be found if the patentee has received 
an agreed-upon price.333 Lexmark received a reward to the invention at the 
time of the foreign sales.334 The cartridges were lawfully sold because they 
were sold through Lexmark’s own distribution network.335 
Additionally, the risk of competitive harm that may result from 
Lexmark’s maintenance of the cartridge price in the United States, will 
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provide another reason to support the conclusion of patent exhaustion.336 In 
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., the 
Court refused to consider the right holder’s interests in maintaining a price 
discrimination in copyright exhaustion. 337  Also, Kirtsaeng condemned a 
scheme of market division.338 Thus, it was not surprising that the Supreme 
Court rejected Lexmark’s argument and held that the analysis of patent 
exhaustion should not include Lexmark’s price discrimination scheme.339 
Therefore, the proposed test will lead to the adoption of international 
patent exhaustion and the rejection of Lexmark’s argument regarding the 
single-use/no-resale restriction as the Supreme Court decided in Impression 
Products because the cartridges were lawfully made and sold even though 
they were reprogrammed and refilled after the use by buyers.340 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The alienation of property is a fundamental tenet of property law. 
Servitudes bind successors in the ownership of property and cause inflictions 
with the marketability principle. Through the common law prohibition 
against servitudes, courts have prevented property from becoming 
unmarketable or unusable. Additionally, the alienability of personal property 
has been further promoted by rules such as the BOCB provision in the 
U.C.C., to meet the heightened need for the smooth commercial transactions. 
The urban development in the twentieth century paved the way for the 
acceptance of equitable servitudes. Servitudes were suited to balance various 
interests. Nevertheless, as far as personal property is concerned, only a small 
number of courts have held servitudes valid. Attempts to create equitable 
servitudes by notices have failed. 
Thus, when an intellectual property owner imposes restraints on the use 
and sale of products, the common law prohibition against restraints on the 
alienation of personal property prompts courts to apply intellectual property 
exhaustion. Moreover, equity considerations have supplemented the 
application of the common law rule. In this regard, the Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes § 3.1 provides helpful guidance in understanding 
why courts have applied exhaustion of intellectual property rights to 
individual cases. A restraint on the use and sale of personal property is likely 
to be invalidated if (1) it is arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious; (2) it 
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unreasonably burdens a constitutional right; (3) it imposes unreasonable 
restraints on the alienation; (4) it imposes restraints on trade or competition; 
or (5) it is unconscionable. 
In copyright exhaustion, courts have emphasized the importance of 
alienation of items and have invalidated restraints that impose unreasonable 
restraints on competition. With regards to the requirement that the item was 
lawfully made and sold, courts have flexibly interpreted the requirement and 
applied exhaustion to cases in which copyright owners argued that the 
agreement was a license, or that the owner never transferred title to the copy. 
As seen in Kirtsaeng, equity will exert modulating effects when copyright 
owners take measures that limit the buyers’ ability to use and sell copies. 
Patent exhaustion is not entirely different from copyright exhaustion 
because patent exhaustion has been formed through the combined 
application of the common law prohibition against servitudes and equity. As 
with copyright exhaustion, a “lawfully made and sold” item must be found. 
Uniquely in patent exhaustion, courts carefully examine whether a patentee 
has received a reward for the invention such that it could be viewed as a sale. 
In examining a reward for the patentee, courts consider relevant public 
interests, such as maintenance of a free market and the Patent Act’s ultimate 
purpose. 
The proposed two-step analysis of patent exhaustion combines a step 
related to the classic common law prohibition against servitudes and a step 
for a multifactorial equity analysis. At the first stage, a decision should be 
made as to whether a case requires protection of third-party purchasers in 
relation to the ownership interest in the “lawfully made and sold” product. 
At the second stage, pertinent inquiries will include, whether a patentee had 
an opportunity to receive an agreed-upon price or a plausible value for the 
invention, and whether there is an unreasonable restraint upon the alienation 
of goods, interference with constitutional freedom, competitive injury, and 
arbitrary enforcement. 
Application of the proposed test demonstrates that international patent 
exhaustion should be adopted, and that the post-sale restrictions in 
Impression Products could not prevent patent exhaustion. The Supreme 
Court’s reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Impression Products 
sheds a light on an important question in patent law and the law of equitable 
servitudes. 
 
